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Abstract
The paper uses data from the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2)
to investigate the impact of fertility on poverty in rural Malawi. We use two measures of
poverty; the objective and the subjective. After accounting for endogeneity of fertility
by using son preference as an instrumental variable, we nd that fertility increases the
probability of being objectively poor. This e¤ect is robust for all poverty lines used.
It is also robust to accounting for economies of scale and household composition as
well as assuming that poverty is continuous. We also nd that when fertility is treated
as an exogenous variable its impact is underestimated. When poverty is measured
subjectively, the results are opposite to those of objective poverty. We nd that fertility
lowers the likelihood of feeling poor, and that fertility is exogenous with respect to
subjective poverty.
1 Introduction
Research looking at the relationship between poverty and fertility at the micro level on
the African continent remains scarce. Ironically, Africa has the highest rates of poverty
and fertility. A lack of data has often been given as the reason for the paradoxical lack of
studies on the continent. Empirically, there has not been any consensus as to the nature
of the relationship between fertility and poverty. The mixed empirical results include; no
relationship between fertility and poverty in Botswana (Chernichovsky 1984), a positive
relationship in Sierra Leone and Ethiopia (Ketkar 1979), a negative relationship in Burkina
Faso (Langani 1997) and in Southern Sudan (Cohen and House 1994). Further to that,
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Noumbissi and Sanderson (1998) nd that in Cameroon where fertility rates are very high, the
relationship takes the inverse J shape, implying that both low and high-income households
have lower rates of fertility, whereas medium level income households have higher fertility.
The J shape is explained by the fact very low income households tend to be landless farmers;
as a result they dont depend on children as cheap labor, whereas those with the highest
income have lower fertility due to higher investment in child quality. The middle income
families are landholding farms which depend on cheap labor, and therefore have a higher
demand for child quantity.
The common thing about all the cited studies is that they treated fertility as an exogenous
variable. By doing that, these studies ignored the fact that fertility can inuence poverty,
and at same time be a¤ected by it. That is, causality can run in both directions. Technically,
they did not take into account the simultaneity that exists between the two variables. Further
to that, they also ignored the fact that there are unobserved factors which inuence both
variables; that is unobserved heterogeneity1 was not accounted for. Another shortfall of
these studies is that they only focussed on poverty dened in the objective monetary sense
which is a narrower denition of household welfare. Subjective measures of welfare better
capture the multidimensional nature of poverty. They are likely to include a households
feelings of relative deprivation, exclusion from services and institutions, as well as feelings
of marginalization related to household or individual status (such as ethnicity, or marital
status) (Devereux et al. 2006). It is therefore also interesting to see how fertility impacts on
poverty when poverty is conceived multidimensionally.
Disregarding simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent es-
timates. It is therefore important for the reliability of results of any econometric analysis
that they be accounted for. It is also worth noting that despite the poverty-fertility rela-
tionship being a demographic issue as well as an economic one; most of the studies on the
continent have been done by demographers. These studies have mostly been descriptive in
nature. And as discussed before the results have been divergent with some studies nd-
ing no relationship, while other studies nd a negative or positive relationship. The only
study we are aware of which accounts for the two e¤ects was done in India by Gupta and
Dubey (2006). With respect to Malawi, there have been a few studies which have looked
at factors which inuence objective poverty (Mukherjee and Benson 2003; Bokosi 2007) but
none of these has looked at the impact of fertility on objective poverty let alone subjective
poverty. The questions that this study therefore seeks to answer are twofold. Firstly, taking
into account the simultaneity and unobserved e¤ects, how does fertility impact on objective
1Manski (1993) calls this the correlated e¤ect.
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poverty in Malawi? Secondly, taking into account the simultaneity and unobserved e¤ects,
how does fertility impact on subjective poverty in Malawi? Answering these questions is
signicant in the sense that it will go a long way in contributing to the literature on poverty
and fertility in Malawi as well as the African continent at large. Additionally, by using a
methodology that captures the problems that the previous studies have ignored, we will be
making a contribution with respect to how the two variables should be conceptualized and
modeled. Further to that, by using subjective poverty, the study will shed some light on the
impact of fertility on a broader denition of household welfare.
After accounting for endogeneity of fertility by using a natural experiment, son preference as
our instrumental variable, the study nds a positive relationship between fertility and objec-
tive poverty. That is, having a large family increases the likelihood of being objectively poor.
This e¤ect is robust for all poverty lines used. It is also robust to accounting for economies
of scale and household composition as well as assuming that poverty is continuous. We also
nd that when fertility is treated as an exogenous variable its impact is underestimated.
When poverty is dened more broadly by using self rated assessments of welfare, the results
are opposite to those of objective poverty. We nd that fertility lowers the likelihood of
feeling poor, that is having more than two children (a large family) lowers the probability
of feeling poor. The study also nds that fertility is exogenous with respect to subjective
poverty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present arguments for why
causality between fertility and poverty is bidirectional. Section 3 focuses on the measurement
of objective and subjective poverty, and fertility. Section 4 dwells on the specication of the
empirical model, data, and descriptives. Econometric results are the focus of section 5. Our
conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2 The poverty-fertility nexus
In this section, we give explanations which have been given in the literature which show that
causality between fertility and poverty is bidirectional. The link between poverty and fertility
may run from fertility to poverty. Poor households with big families have large dependency
ratios, as a result investments in the human capital of children, which improve the future
prospects of the children may be sacriced to more immediate household needs such as food.
This conict is especially likely when the opportunity cost of certain investments in children
(such as education) is high because of the associated loss of child labor in agriculture or
home work (Birdsall and Gri¢ n 1988).
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Family size may have a negative impact on child development and human capital formation,
and hence their future economic status. For instance, studies in both developed and
developing countries nd that children in big families tend to be shorter, less intelligent,
and are even less likely to survive (e.g. Birdsall 1977; Bielicki 1986; Casterline et al.1987).
Birdsall (1980) found that though total household spending on education tends to rise with
family size, expenditures per child on education tend to be lower in large families for all
income and education levels of the parents. Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980, in a study of
families with twins in India found that the additional unexpected child represented by twins
reduced enrollment levels of all children in the household. Using Malaysian data, Rosenzweig
and Schultz 1987 show that couples with a higher biological propensity to have births, also
have lower schooling attainment for their children. A childs ability to learn is inuenced
by the amount and quality of attention received from parents and other adults in the rst
few years, and that is generally less in large families. Hence, children from large families
are more likely not to be very educated and this makes them to be more prone to poverty
(Birdsall and Gri¢ n 1988). U.S. studies show that women with large families put in no
more time on child care; educated women succeed in spending more time with each child
principally by having fewer children (see Birdsall 1977).
On the other hand, the link between poverty and fertility may run from poverty to fertility.
Parents whose children die may try to replace them, and since high mortality is generally
high in poor households, parents may try to insure themselves against possible child loss by
having more children than they would otherwise want. Olsen (1987 cited in Birdsall and
Gri¢ n 1988) found that parents in Colombia directly replaced at least 0.2 of children that
had died, but further compensated by having on average about 0.14 extra children. Similar
results were found for Malaysia (Olsen 1983 cited in Birdsall and Gri¢ n 1988). Thus,
hoarding by having extra children can be interpreted as an insurance strategy by parents in
the presence of high infant mortality. As the risk of infant mortality diminishes, hoarding
becomes unnecessary (Birdsall and Gri¢ n 1988). Related to this, is that poor households
may decide to have more children as a source of support in old age given the absence of life
insurance markets and social security in many developing countries.
According to the quantity-quality theory of Becker and Lewis (1973), increases in income
lead to an increase in demand for quality of children and a fall in the quantity of children.
Thus, as households become wealthier, they will tend to have fewer children. Additionally,
Willis (1973) argues that increases in womens wages (and therefore income) leads to fewer
children, as this increases the opportunity cost of having more children.
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3 Measurement of objective and subjective poverty
and fertility
In this section, we discuss the measurement of both objective monetary poverty and subjec-
tive poverty as well as fertility. Objective poverty can be measured either by using household
income or household consumption expenditure. Following Mukherjee and Benson (2003), we
use a consumption expenditure based measure of poverty rather than income2. In the objec-
tive and monetary poverty analysis income or consumption is considered to be a measure of
welfare. This approach reects how most empirical work on poverty in Africa has been done.
A households subjective assessment of its well being is however much broader. Subjective
well being (SWB) better captures the multidimensional nature of poverty. Subjective mea-
sures are likely to extend well beyond the narrow income or consumption needs, as they will
include a households feelings of relative deprivation, exclusion from services and institutions,
as well as feelings of marginalization related to household or individual status (such as eth-
nicity, or marital status) (Devereux et al. 2006). Due to its broader scope, it is possible that
some factors might a¤ect the two poverty denitions di¤erently. It is therefore imperative
that we investigate how fertility impacts subjective poverty to complete the picture. There
are three alternative subjectivequestions which are used to measure subjective wellbeing.
Firstly, there is what is called the Income Evaluation Question (IEQ) introduced by Van
Praag (1971). The IEQ asks what level of income is regarded as very bad, bad,not good,
not bad, good, very good. The IEQ for example goes like Taking into account my (our)
present living circumstances, I would regard a net weekly/monthly/yearly (encircle period)
family income as: excellent, good,. . . ,.bad, very bad.Secondly, there is the Minimum In-
come Question (MIQ). Here people are asked what they consider as a minimum level of
income to make ends meet. The MIQ is for example phrased like We would like you to tell
us the absolute minimum income of money for a household such as yours in other words, a
sum below which you couldnt make ends meet.The MIQ has been criticized for its focus
on income, in that the concept of income may be poorly dened for respondents particularly
but not only in developing countries (Ravallion and Lokshin 2002). Both the IEQ and MIQ
2We use consumption expenditure other than income for two reasons. First, particularly in an agricultural
economy such as Malawi, income is often very lumpy. Farming households receive a large amount of cash
income in May and June after the harvest, and receive very little the rest of the year. In contrast, households
are constantly expending their income and consuming. Consumption expenditure is a smoother measure of
welfare through time than is income. In other words, consumption can be viewed as realized welfare, whereas
income is more a measure of potential welfare (Murkhejee and Benson 2003). Second, in Malawi much of
household income is derived from self-employed business or subsistence-oriented agricultural production.
Assigning income values to the proceeds of these enterprises is often problematic (Hentschel and Lanjouw
1996).
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are based on income as a measure of welfare, and therefore they are not broad. A measure of
subjective poverty which is much broader and open-minded is the Economic Ladder Question
(ELQ). Here the respondents are asked a question framed as follows: Please imagine a 6-
step ladder where on the bottom, the rst step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest
step, the sixth, stand the rich. On which step are you today?(Kalugina and Najman 2002).
In the survey data we are using, this question was answered by the household head. Owing
to its broadness relative to the IEQ and the MIQ, we employ the ELQ method to measuring
subjective poverty3. In this study, we measure fertility as the number of children4.
4 Methodology
4.1 Motivation of the methodology
In order to take into account the fact that fertility and poverty (objective and subjective)
are potentially endogenous, we use instrumental variable (IV) estimation. We use a natural
experiment as our instrument5. For the IV to be valid it must be correlated with fertility but
should be uncorrelated with poverty. Our use of a natural experiment is inspired by a number
of studies in the labour supply literature. Bronars and Grogger (1994) use the incidence of
twins in the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Samples to estimate the e¤ect
of an unplanned second child on labor force participation for unwed mothers. Angrist and
Evans (1998) study the labor supply of married women with at least two children, using
both twins and the gender mix of the rst two children as instruments. Since parents tend
to prefer having a mix of genders among their children, gender mix operates as an instrument
because couples with two children of the same sex are more likely to have a third child than
couples with one boy and one girl. It has to be said that using twins reduces usable data
dramatically, and using sibling sex mix as an instrument applies in the US and probably other
western countries. In most developing countries, parents tend to prefer sons to daughters.
3The use of subjective wellbeing is advantageous in the sense that well being is self rated. These measures
are however not completely perfect. For example, an individuals answers could be inuenced by di¤erent
factors, for instance, attitudes and anticipations. Individuals may estimate themselves by the means of
comparison with socially accepted norms and rules, their group of reference etc (Kalugina and Najman 2002;
Kingdon and Knight 2003).
4A Fertility measure normally used by demographers is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) which is dened
as the average number of children that would be born alive to a woman at the end of her reproductive period
given the current specic fertility rate.
5A natural experiment is a naturally occurring random event or situation, which can be exploited as an
instrumental variable. For a discussion on natural experiments in economics see Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(2000).
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Gupta and Dubey (2006) in a study of the impact of fertility on poverty in India (which is
probably the rst to use IV estimation) use having two girls rst as an IV on households
with more than two children. A priori parents are more likely to have another child if the
rst two are girls.
Just like Gupta and Dubey (2006) we use son preference as our IV. Sons are preferred in
the developing world for a number of reasons. First, in many societies, old-age support is
exclusively the task of male o¤spring by way of social practice and tradition. Even though
female o¤spring may be just as able to o¤er support, there may be a stigma associated with
receiving such support from daughters. Second, in societies where female employment is not
in demand or undervalued, males may be potentially more productive future assets(Gupta
and Dubey 2006). Finally, sons may be preferred to daughters for the continuation of the
family name.
4.2 Model specication
Following the motivation given in the preceding section, we specify a recursive bivariate
probit model which nets out simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity e¤ects and therefore
enables us to isolate the causal e¤ect of fertility on poverty (objective and subjective). We
have two dependent variables; poverty status and fertility which are binary. Our unit of
analysis is a household.
4.2.1 Objective poverty
As discussed earlier, in this study we measure objective poverty using consumption, and a
household is dened as poor if its total real annualized per capita consumption expenditure
(Yi) falls below the poverty line. Letting Y PL be a poverty line, then household i is poor
(Ti = 1) if Yi  Y PL and non poor (Ti = 0) if Yi > Y PL. Parameter estimates of a probit
change with the poverty line. This means that the e¤ects of di¤erent variables on poverty
are strictly speaking specic to that poverty line. To nd out whether or not the e¤ect of
fertility on poverty is robust to choice of poverty line we use three poverty lines, and look
for the presence of sign reversals in the impact of fertility on the alternative poverty lines.
When there are no sign reversals i.e. monotonicity holds, then the results can be considered
rst order dominant, implying that the direction of the impact of a fertility variable on the
probability of being poor remains the same regardless of poverty line selected (Ravallion
1996).
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We use three poverty lines; two as dened by the National Statistical O¢ ce of Malawi (NSO),
and the third as dened by the World Bank. The two NSO poverty lines are; one for those
considered ultra poor which is 10029 Malawi Kwacha per year, and another for the poor
which is 16165 Malawi Kwacha per year. The World Bank poverty line is the US $1 per day
(equivalent to an annualized gure of 11051 Malawi Kwacha after adjusting for purchasing
power parity). The NSO poverty lines are based on the cost of basic needs approach. And
they are adjusted for interspatial and intertemporal price di¤erences. It is worth pointing out
at this stage, that there is an unsettled debate in the poverty literature regarding whether
poverty should be modeled as a continuous variable by using a levels regression or as a
dummy by using probit or logit models. The rst advantage of the levels regression is
that it uses all the information on the distribution of consumption expenditure, whilst the
binary model loses important information by collapsing consumption expenditure into two
values. Secondly, the binary variable is derived from an observed continuous variable, and
this runs counter to the fundamental assumption on which the probit or logit is based.
Specically, the binary indictor models assume that there is an unobserved latent response
variable which generates an observed binary variable (Ravallion 1996). However, the levels
regression has a major shortcoming in that it imposes constant parameters over the entire
distribution and thus assumes that the impact of various factors on welfare is constant
across the expenditure distribution. That is, it assumes that there is no di¤erence between
the rich and the poor in terms of their characteristics. In reality, the poor face di¤erent
constraints such access to credit and services. As Grootaert (1997) argues, the poors ability
to cope with these constraints can be envisaged as a latent variable which is a function of
household characteristics which generates binary welfare outcomes. In this study, we use
both approaches to check the robustness of our results to the poverty denition.
Fertility (Zi) is dened as equal to one if a household has more than two children and zero
if it has two6. Our study is essentially about large families versus small families. It should
also be pointed out that son preference would be more evident in the birth of the third child
and not the second child since most families prefer having at least two children (Gupta and
Dubey 2006). This implies that the son preference IV only works in the transition from the
second to the third child. We later (see subsection 5.8) change this denition of fertility, as
a way of checking the sensitivity of our results to the denition of family size. The poverty
and fertility equations are jointly estimated in a recursive bivariate probit which is formally
specied below.
6One can also quite plausibly assume that there is a latent variable which depends on personal and
household characteristics which generates binary fertility outcomes i.e large family versus small family.
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Consider the following levels regression;
Yi = 
0Xi + Zi + "i (1)
then poverty status is dened as;
Ti =
(
1 if Yi  Y PL (poor)
0 if Yi > Y
PL (non poor)
(2)
Consider the following levels regression for number of children (Ci);
Ci = 
0Xi + Mi + i (3)
then fertility is dened as;
Zi =
(
1 if Ci > 2
0 if Ci = 2
(4)
The recursive bivariate probit is therefore dened as;
Pr(Ti = 1; Zi = 1jXi; Zi;Mi) = i2
 
Y PL   (0Xi + Zi); (0Xi + Mi)  2; 

(5)
Where, i2 (   ) is the bivariate normal cumulative density function, Xi is a vector of exoge-
nous variables which inuence both fertility and poverty,Mi is a zero-one dummy IV dened
as equal to one if the rst two children are girls and zero otherwise.  and  are vectors of
parameters to be estimated, and  and  are scalar parameters of the fertility dummy and
the IV respectively. "i and i error terms with the following properties;
 = Cov ("ii) (6)
E("ijXi; Zi;Mi) = E(ijXi;Mi) = 0 (7)
V ar("ijXi; Zi;Mi) = V ar(ijXi;Mi) = 1 (8)
The parameters , , , ,  are estimated by maximum likelihood (see Maddala 1983;
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Greene 2003; and Monfardini and Radice 2008 for more details).
The log likelihood to be maximized is7;
L(; ; ; ; ) =
X
d11 lnP
11
i + d10 lnP
10
i + d01 lnP
01
i + d00 lnP
00
i

(9)
where :
d11 = TiZi; d10 = Ti(1  Zi); d01 = Zi(1  Ti); d00 = (1  Zi)(1  Ti)
P 11i = Pr(Ti = 1; Zi = 1jXi; Zi;Mi) = i2(0Xi + ; 0Xi + ; )
P 10i = Pr(Ti = 1; Zi = 0jXi; Zi;Mi) = i2( 0Xi   ; 0Xi + ; )
P 01i = Pr(Ti = 0; Zi = 1jXi; Zi;Mi) = i2(0Xi + ; 0Xi   ; )
P 00i = Pr(Ti = 0; Zi = 0jXi; Zi;Mi) = i2( 0Xi   ; 0Xi   ; )
Testing the null that  = 0 using a Wald test amounts to testing for the exogeneity of
fertility. The specied recursive bivariate probit corrects for simultaneity (through the IV)
and at the same time controls for unobserved heterogeneity (by allowing correlation between
the errors which capture unobserved factors among other things). Our two equation system
is identied by way of exclusion restriction i.e. the poverty equation does not have Mi the
IV as a regressor8.
The coe¢ cients in any limited dependent variable model can be misleading. Since the model
is a probability model, the absolute level of a coe¢ cient can convey a wrong picture of the
impact of a regressor on the dependent variable. To overcome this problem, we compute
marginal e¤ects on the conditional mean function given by;
7For ease of exposition and in keeping with Maddala (1983), Greene (2003), and Monfardini and Radice
(2008), we express the log likelihood assuming that the poverty and fertility thresholds are at zero. This
simplication does not a¤ect our analysis.
8It should however be pointed out that theoretically it is possible to achieve identication by functional
form only i.e. without exclusion restrictions. This type of identication depends entirely on the bivariate
normality of the errors. The exclusion restrictions help in making results robust to distributional misspeci-
cation (Monfardini and Radice 2008). Further, in our case the instrument allows us to check the robustness
of our probit results to assuming that poverty is continuous.
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E [TijXi; Zi;Mi] = Pr [Zi = 1]E [TijZi = 1; Xi; Zi;Mi]
+Pr [Zi = 0]E [TijZi = 0; Xi; Zi;Mi] (10)
= Pr(Ti = 1; Zi = 1jXi; Zi;Mi) + Pr(Ti = 1; Zi = 0jXi; Zi;Mi)
= i2(
0Xi + ; 
0Xi + ; ) + i2( 0Xi   ; 0Xi + ; )
= P 11i + P
10
i
The marginal e¤ects are just the derivatives of this conditional mean function9. For variables
which appear in both the fertility and poverty equations, the total marginal e¤ect of these
variables is decomposed into the direct e¤ect (derivative of the second part of equation 10)
and the indirect e¤ect (derivative of the rst part of equation 10). This indirect e¤ect works
through fertility. For example, education may a¤ect poverty directly, but may also a¤ect
poverty indirectly through its impact on fertility. For binary explanatory variables, we do
not take derivatives of equation 10 rather the marginal e¤ect is just the di¤erence in the
conditional mean function with the dummy set equal to one and zero (Greene 2003). The
marginal e¤ect of fertility on poverty is calculated as follows;
Pr(Ti = 1; jZi = 1jXi;Mi)  Pr(Ti = 1; jZi = 0jXi;Mi) (11)
The marginal e¤ects in the fertility equation are just the derivatives of the marginal distri-
bution quite like in a univariate probit.
4.2.2 Subjective poverty
As said earlier, this study uses the ELQ method to measure subjective poverty. Using this
method, one can model subjective poverty using an ordered probit model (see for example
Ravallion and Lokshin 2002), where the rungs of the ladder represent ordered outcomes.
Following Devereux et al. (2006) and Kalugina and Najman (2002), we dene a subjective
poverty dummy as follows; households are subjectively poor if they fall on the bottom two
rungs of the ladder and non-poor if they fall on rungs 3 to 6. So the impact of fertility on
subjective poverty is modelled using the recursive bivariate probit presented in the preceding
section for objective poverty.
In addition to the variables already discussed, for both objective and subjective poverty we
9If  = 0 then the two parts of equation 10 reduce to a product of marginals (Greene 2003).
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include variables to capture household demographics, education, employment, agriculture,
religion, and community level characteristics. We also control for regional e¤ects by including
regional dummies. The denition of the independent variables is presented in appendix Table
A1.
4.3 Data and descriptives
The data for this analysis come from the SecondMalawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2).
This is a nationally representative sample survey designed to provide information on the
various aspects of household welfare in Malawi. The survey was conducted by the National
Statistical O¢ ce from March 2004-April 2005. The survey collected information from a
nationally representative sample of 11,280 households. In addition, information was also
collected from a nationally representative sample of 564 communities. The households were
sampled from these communities. The survey collects demographic information which inter
alia includes; age, sex, together with the relationship of each household member to the
household head. This information allows us to identify children and their birth orders,
which we then use to generate the son preference IV. The survey also collects information
on subjective assessment of well-being. Out of a total of 11280 households, we focus on 9827
rural households (87%) of the total, as it is the rural areas where son preference may be
more evident. Because the survey does not track children across households; we impose the
following restriction on the rural sample. The sample is limited to mothers aged 20-40, whose
oldest child was less than 17 years of age at the time of the survey. Since we are focusing
on households with at least two children, we would not expect many women younger than
age 20 to have two children. Besides, it is to be expected that a child over age 17 has moved
to a di¤erent household10. We therefore have about 3400 rural households constituting the
restricted sample.
Table 1, presents objective poverty rates for the three poverty lines11. The results indicate
that for all rural households, 56.4% are poor with a corresponding restricted sample head
count rate of 52.5%. Additionally, 24.4% and 21.8% of all rural and restricted rural house-
10Similar restrictions are used by Angrist and Evans (1998), and Gupta and Dubey (2006). We later relax
these age restrictions in subsection 5.7, to see if our results are not a¤ected by the possiblity of sample
selection.
11The poverty indices are based on the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) measure given by P(ci; z) =
1
n
qX
i=1
 
gi
z

. Where ci is consumption of household i , z is the poverty line, and gi = ci z is a consumption
shortfall. q is the number of poor households,  is a measure of poverty aversion. For  = 0 we have the
headcount, for  = 1 we have the poverty gap, for  = 2 we have the poverty severity index.
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holds respectively are ultra poor. This means that about one in ve of the rural population
(restricted and unrestricted) live in dire poverty such that they cannot even a¤ord to meet
the minimum standard daily recommended food requirement. In terms of the World Bank
poverty line of US$1 a day, 30.6% and 27.7% of all Malawians residing in rural areas and
those in the restricted rural sample respectively live on less than a dollar a day. Using the
three poverty lines, we also nd that the poverty gap measures are similar for the two sam-
ples. For instance, using the poor poverty line we nd that the poor for all rural households
(restricted rural households) have a poverty gap of 19.3% (17.7%) suggesting that they on
average subsist on 19.3% (17.7%) less than K16165. What is therefore emerging from the
results is that even though the poverty rates for all rural households are consistently higher
than those for the restricted sample, the di¤erence is not very big. This would imply that the
restricted sample that we are using for this study is a reasonable representation of all rural
households. In Table 2, we present results of the relationship between poverty headcounts
and fertility measured as number of children. We nd that for all poverty lines the poverty
headcount rate is increasing with the number of children. For example, using the poor
poverty line we nd that for the unrestricted (restricted) 47.3% (46.2%) of households with
less than three children are poor; this is in contrast to a headcount rate of 71.6% (74.5%) for
those households with more than six children. This suggests that poverty and fertility might
be positively related. This pattern holds for both samples; we should also note that the
head counts are not very di¤erent for the two samples implying that our restricted sample
represents quite well the rural population.
We now turn to the descriptive analysis of subjective poverty. We nd that 84.8% of all rural
households consider themselves to be subjectively poor with a corresponding gure of 83.5%
for the restricted sample. These rates are very high as compared to the objective rates given
in Table 1. In Table 3, we check the relationship between subjective poverty headcounts and
the number of children. The results show an opposite relationship to that found under the
objective poverty analysis (Table 2). Where as before we found that the more the number
of children the higher the poverty rate; the results here show that the more the number of
children a household has the lower the subjective poverty. This suggests that there might
be a negative relationship between subjective poverty and fertility.
Table 4 summarizes results of the relationship between objective poverty and subjective
poverty12. The results suggest that the objectively and subjectively poor are not the same
people. This is evidenced by the fact that the o¤-diagonals (unshaded cells) are nonzero.
12Since the results for the restricted and whole samples are similar, we only report results for all rural
households
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This indicates that the matching of households between the two denitions of poverty is
weak. For example, using the poor poverty line, we nd that of 1359 households who
are subjectively non-poor only 987 households are non-poor in the objective sense13. The
Cramers V statistics test the null hypothesis of no association between the two measures.
A Cramers V statistic of close to 1 (0) indicates strong (weak) association. The values
are between 0 and 1, implying that there is a relationship between the two and this is
conrmed by the likelihood test (probabilities of the chi-square are zero.) It is however
worth emphasizing that the relationship is not very strong.
In Table 5, we report results of the descriptive analysis of the explanatory variables used
in the study. The average number of children is 2.9. About three quarters of households
have more than two children. Households which have two girls rst make about 19% of our
sample. This would suggest weak evidence of non random sex targeting since you expect
the proportion of households with two girls rst to be 25%. Education levels are low as
is indicated by very low averages of numbers of people both male and female with some
education be it primary or secondary. The averages are less than one suggesting very low
numbers of people with education. In terms of education of parents, we note that fathers
have more education than mothers as we move up the education ladder. For instance,13.6%
of fathers have secondary as their highest education level as compared to just about 5% for
mothers. The labour force participation for fathers is higher than that of mothers with 23%
of fathers working for a wage compared to 4% for mothers.
The average for number of enterprises is very low indicating that very few households engage
in non-agricultural income generating activities. About a quarter of our sampled households
grow tobacco which is a cash crop. The results indicate that close to two thirds of households
have no clinics in their communities; in addition 2% of the households live in trading centres
suggesting that most households are not close to markets. In Table 5, we also show descriptive
statistics for all rural households14. This is done in order to check the representativeness of
the variables used in our regression analyses. The results indicate that the restricted sample
is generally not very di¤erent from the sample of all rural households; suggesting that it is
a realistic representation of rural households. For example, the average number of children
for the two or more children sample is slightly higher than that of all households, 2.9 against
2.4 for all households. In terms of employment, we also note that the sample of two or more
children households has somewhat higher labor force participation rates for both fathers and
mothers. Looking at all rural households their educational measures are to some extent
13A similar mismatch is found by Ravallion and Lokshin (2002) for Russia.
14These are households with at least one child.
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lower. The same pattern emerges for religion and community characteristics.
5 Econometric results
In this section, we present econometric results of the impact of fertility on objective and
subjective poverty. We start with the presentation and discussion of results for objective
poverty, and this is followed later by results for subjective poverty.
5.1 Impact of exogenous fertility on objective poverty
In this section results (Table 6) of naïve univariate probit regressions which assume that fer-
tility is exogenous for the three poverty lines are presented and discussed. These results serve
as our base for comparison with the scenario where we assume that fertility is endogenous.
For all the three poverty regressions, the chi-square statistics show all variables included in
the models are jointly signicant.
Similar to the ndings of Gupta and Dubey (2006), the univariate probit results suggest a
positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of fertility on poverty. This implies that exogenous
fertility increases the likelihood of being poor. The size of the e¤ect ranges from 11% to
23%, and these values are economically substantial. This relationship is monotonic, as it
holds for all the three poverty lines, suggesting that our results are robust to choice of a
poverty line and that the rst order dominance assumption is not violated. We also observe
that the impact of exogenous fertility on poverty increases as the poverty line increases i.e.
moving from ultra poor to poor. This might indicate that children become more expensive
as your income increases as households opt for good quality children. As expected, the
dependency ratio is signicantly and positively related to poverty across the three poverty
lines. An increase in the dependency ratio ceteris paribus increases the probability of falling
into poverty by 4%, 5.7% and 11% for ultra poor, World Bank, and poor poverty lines
respectively. These e¤ects are quite large economically. Having secondary education for
mothers and fathers signicantly a¤ects poverty. The relationship as expected is negative.
Holding other things constant, when a father (mother) has secondary education it lowers
the likelihood of being poor by 5% (7%), 8.8% (6.6%), and 18.9% (18.4%) for ultra poor,
World Bank, and poor poverty lines respectively. All the other education variables have the
expected negative sign but their impact is statistically insignicant. It should however be
pointed out that the magnitudes of the education variables are economically quite signicant.
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With respect to employment, we nd that for fathers being employed for a wage lowers
the likelihood of being poor with economically signicant e¤ects ranging from 4% to 6%.
However, for mothers being employed for a wage is not statistically signicant, probably
reecting the very low labour force participation rates for mothers (see Table 5). In terms
of the magnitude of the e¤ect, we note that they are quite large with values quite similar
to those for fathers. The more non agricultural income generating enterprises a household
has, the lower the chance of being poor. For instance, using the poor poverty line we note
that ceteris paribus having more enterprises increases the probability of being non poor by
about 10%. The e¤ect is increasing on successive poverty lines suggesting that the e¤ect is
more pronounced as the level of consumption increases. Accessing loans has the expected
negative and signicant e¤ect on poverty.
Growing tobacco which is a cash crop has the expected negative relationship with poverty.
The impact is both statistically and economically signicant, with the magnitude ranging
from 1% to 9.6%. We notice however that for the lowest poverty line (ultra poor), growing
tobacco is not statistically signicant suggesting that tobacco growing has no statistically
signicant e¤ect on poverty at the lower end of the income distribution even though the e¤ect
seems to be economically large (about 1%). The statistical insignicance perhaps reects
the fact that due to its high cost nature very few ultra poor households can grow tobacco.
Unsurprisingly, land which is a productive resource, statistically signicantly increases the
chance of being non poor. And the magnitude of the e¤ects suggests that it is economi-
cally signicant. Although the importance of livestock as a means of livelihood is falling in
Malawi, the results suggest that holding other things constant, owning livestock increases the
probability of being non poor by 3%, 4% and 6% for the ultra poor, World Bank, and poor
poverty lines respectively. Having a clinic in a community lowers the probability of being
poor by 3%, 5%, and 7% in the ultra poor, World Bank, and poor poverty lines respectively.
These e¤ects are substantial from an economic as well as a statistical viewpoint. As might
be expected, the presence of a clinic would imply easily accessible medical attention which
would among other things improve the productivity of people in the area.
Our discussion above has been based on the assumption that fertility is exogenous, but as
discussed before fertility might be endogenous. In the next section, we address this issue of
endogeneity of fertility.
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5.2 Controlling for endogenous fertility
As discussed before, to account for endogeneity we need an instrumental variable. In our
case we are using son preference as our IV. Before we go ahead to use the IV we rst check
two things. Firstly, we test using a hazard model whether indeed son preference exists in
rural Malawi. Secondly, we then check the validity of son preference as an IV. We address
each one of these issues in the next subsections.
5.2.1 Evidence of son preference in rural Malawi
Since the focus of this study is not on measuring son preference, we will not be too detailed
about the methodology (for details see Haughton and Haughton 1998). In order to test for
evidence of son preference, we need to rst dene what we mean by son preference. There
are basically two concepts of son preference. The rst is called lexicographic preferences; also
referred to as the threshold, xed minima, or target view of son preference, this approach
assumes that the ith household desires Si sons, regardless of the number of daughters which it
will need to have to achieve this goal. In practice, the target is likely to vary over households,
and it may vary within a household over time, either way it is an unobservable quantity.
The second concept of son preference is what is called sequential preference. This obtains
when for any given number of sons and daughters, parents prefer an additional son to an
additional daughter.
To measure lexicographic preferences you need families which have stopped child-bearing i.e.
complete families (Haughton and Haughton 1998). To measure sequential preference you can
use incomplete families. Since in the IHS2 data there is no distinction between complete and
incomplete families, we use the concept of sequential preference to measure son preference.
Sequential preference can be measured by using a hazard model. The hazard model estimates
the risk (hazard) of having another child at any point in time. For an accelerated failure
time (AFT) model, if the hazard is higher for families with a son (or sons), the implication
is that son preference is present. The dependent variable is the length of the interval (in
months) between one birth and the next, a by-product of recording the birth dates of the
children born in the household. Specically, we focus on two intervals namely the transition
from the second to the third child, and the transition from the third to the fourth child. In
addition to the covariates included in the other regressions, we use the variable boyz which
is the number of existing boys.
If son preference is present, we would expect the coe¢ cient of the variable boyz to be positive,
implying that the higher the number of boys, the longer the duration between births. It is
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supposed that households that do not have as many sons as they wish, will hurry to have
another before it is too late. Underlying this idea is the notion that households may have
sequential son preference. Results in Table 7 are based on the accelerated failure time
Weibull hazard model. For the two transitions, the coe¢ cient of the variable boyz is positive
and signicant suggesting the presence of son preference in rural Malawi15. Among other
variables, we controlled for the employment of the father, and for the interval 2 to 3 we nd
that fathersemployment increases the duration of the birth interval though this e¤ect is
insignicant on the next birth interval. Having found that son preference is present in rural
Malawi the next thing to be done is to check if it is a valid instrument.
5.2.2 Son preference as an instrumental variable
For a variable to be a good IV, it rstly must be uncorrelated with the error term in our case
it must not be correlated with poverty. Secondly, it must be correlated with the endogenous
variable. The consistency of our results may be a¤ected by the possibility that the IV may be
correlated with the error term, that is it may be endogenous. There are two possible scenarios
in which this can happen16. Firstly, there is a possibility of using ultrasound services to know
in advance the sex of a child which the rich can access, which can then be used to do prenatal
sex screening. This would make our IV correlated with economic status (poverty). It however
has to be said that while this is possible in rich countries where medical services are very
advanced, this cannot be the case in rural Malawi where medical facilities are quite basic.
Besides, abortion including sex selective abortion is illegal in Malawi17. The second issue
which can lead to endogeneity is what Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) call the hand-me-down
e¤ect. They argue that the cost of children depends on sex composition and show that there
is strong evidence for a hand-me-down e¤ect. This is an economies of scale e¤ect where if
you have children of the same sex you spend less because there are some things like clothing
which can be used by the child coming after. Now if households with children of the same
sex spend signicantly less money than do households with children of di¤erent sexes, this
di¤erence in consumption may a¤ect the poverty situation of the household. In this case
15To complement these results, we tested (using a t-test) whether or not there is a di¤erence in the
average number of children between households with two girls rst and those with two boys rst. We nd
that households with two girls rst have a signicantly higher number of children with a mean di¤erence
(standard error) of 0.3036 (0.054).
16There is a possibility that poor households may prefer sons to work in the elds, this would also mean
that the instrument would be correlated with poverty. We control for this by including a variable which
captures whether or not children work outside the home.
17There is a possibility of using more traditional sex-targeting mechanisms such as female infanticide and
extreme neglect of female children leading to their eventual death (Sen 1984). However, there is no reported
evidence of this in Malawi.
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therefore the IV is endogenous. In Table 8, we report results of two sample t-tests of mean
di¤erences to check for evidence of the hand-me-down e¤ect. If the hand-me-down e¤ect is
present, we would expect there to be a statistically signicant di¤erence in expenditure on
clothing and education by sex of the child. That is, if the hand-me-down e¤ect is present,
the expenditure on the two items should be signicantly lower for the case where two girls or
two boys are rst than the case where there is a mix of a boy and a girl. However, we do not
nd a statistically signicant di¤erence in expenditure on the two items between households
with two girls rst or two boys rst and those with a girl and a boy. The implication of this
nding is that son preference is not endogenous through the hand-me-down e¤ect. We then
need to check the second condition that son preference and fertility are correlated.
We check for the relationship between fertility and our IV by estimating a reduced form
univariate probit model of fertility. The results are presented in Table 9. Column 1 leaves
out religion, column 2 leaves out region but includes religion, and column 3 has all covariates.
Most of the variables have the expected signs. A fathers education is a strong predictor
of fertility though the education of mother does not have a signicant e¤ect on fertility.
This probably reects the fact in rural households a father has a nal say on everything
including for example contraceptives. And the more educated a father is, the more likely
is the family going to adopt family planning. We nd that if children work at home it
leads to more fertility as more hands are needed for domestic work. Of particular interest
is the relationship between the IV and fertility. Having two girls rst signicantly increases
the probability of having more than two children. The relationship holds for all the three
specications presented in Table 9. This suggests that fertility and the IV are correlated18.
It is worth noting that whether or not we control for religion and region, the e¤ect of having
two girls rst on the probability of having more than two children is not a¤ected by religion
or regional e¤ects.
So far we have found that son preference exists in rural Malawi, and that son preference
is a good IV in the sense that it is uncorrelated with poverty and it is correlated with
fertility. We now test whether fertility is endogenous. We present two complementary tests
of the endogeneity of fertility. Since the condence intervals do not contain a zero, the
cross equation error correlation (rho) results in Table 10 suggest that the null hypothesis of
exogenous fertility is rejected at the 5% signicance level for all poverty lines. This conclusion
is further conrmed by the Wald test results presented in Table 11. As said before failing
to account for endogeneity of fertility would lead to biased and inconsistent results. We
therefore present results of a recursive bivariate probit which jointly estimates fertility and
18This can in a sense be viewed as direct evidence of son preference.
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objective poverty.
5.3 Impact of endogenous fertility on objective poverty
In Tables 12-14, we report the marginal e¤ects of the recursive bivariate probit of the impact
of fertility on poverty for the three poverty thresholds. For all the three poverty lines, the chi-
square statistics suggest that the variables are jointly signicant. The maximum likelihood
results indicate that fertility and poverty are positively related. The e¤ect is statistically
signicant. This implies that fertility increases the probability of being poor. The impacts
are economically signicant with values ranging from 0.139 to 0.304. This relationship is
monotonic, as it holds for the three poverty thresholds, suggesting that just like in the base
scenario where we assumed fertility to be exogenous, our results are robust to choice of a
poverty line. This means that the rst order dominance assumption is not violated. Just like
the naïve results of exogenous fertility, the impact of endogenous fertility across the poverty
lines increases as the poverty line increases i.e. moving from ultra poor to poor. We note
however that the total e¤ect of fertility on poverty is larger than the one we got when we
assumed that fertility is exogenous. This implies that assuming that fertility is exogenous
underestimates its impact on poverty. For all poverty lines, the underestimation is about 1.3
times. It should be pointed out that the statistically signicant e¤ect of endogenous fertility
is not in conformity with a nding by Gupta and Dubey (2006) for India. They nd that the
impact of fertility on poverty is statistically insignicant after controlling for endogeneity.
As expected, the dependency ratio is signicantly and positively related to poverty across
the three poverty lines. The total e¤ect is almost equal to that from the base regressions.
The recursive bivariate probit results show that having secondary education for mothers
and fathers are statistically signicant predictors of poverty. The relationship as expected is
negative. In terms of the size of the impact, we note that in the case of the ultra poor model,
for a father (mother) having secondary education ceteris paribus lowers the probability of
being poor by 5.7% (6.6%), with the e¤ect of a mothers education being slightly higher. As
was the case with the univariate probit, most of the education variables have the expected
negative sign but they are not statistically signicant though they appear economically large.
With respect to employment, we nd that for a father all things being equal, being employed
for a wage lowers the likelihood of being poor. The e¤ect is almost the same as that for the
base regressions for all poverty thresholds. However, as before wage employment for mothers
has no statistically signicant e¤ect. The e¤ect seems to be economically signicant though,
with the magnitudes of the e¤ects similar to those for fathers. Similar to the results from
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the simple probits, we nd that for the lowest poverty line (ultra poor), growing tobacco has
no statistically signicant e¤ect though with a marginal e¤ect of about 1% it would suggest
that the e¤ect is economically sizeable. Land and livestock increase the probability of being
non poor. Having a clinic in a community lowers the probability of being poor by 7% in
the poor poverty line model, and this e¤ect is substantial from an economic as well as a
statistical perspective.
Two things are coming out of our comparison between the base scenario regressions which
assumed that fertility is exogenous and the recursive bivariate probit results. Firstly, all
the variables which were signicant in the simple probit regressions are also signicant after
accounting for endogeneity. Secondly, the total e¤ects for the joint estimation of fertility
and poverty are generally larger than those for the univariate probit regressions.
So far our analysis has been based on real per capita annualized consumption expenditure.
This analysis does not take into account household composition and economies of scales. In
the next section, we investigate whether or not the impact of fertility on objective poverty
that we have found is robust to accounting for household composition and economies of scale.
5.4 Household composition and economies of scale
The use of per capita consumption expenditure is common in poverty studies; however this
procedure has two problems. First, di¤erent individuals have di¤erent needs. For example,
a young child typically requires less food than an adult. Second, there are economies of scale
in consumption for such items as housing, kitchen utensils, and utilities such as electricity.
It costs less to house two people than to house two individuals separately. Larger households
can do bulk buying which can attract discounts. Some studies have shown that the impact of
household size on poverty disappears once these two problems are addressed (e.g. Lanjouw
and Ravallion 1995; White and Masset 2003). The solution to these problems is to use
adult equivalent scales19. An adult equivalent scale measures the number of adult males
(typically) to which that household is deemed to be equivalent20. In this study, we use the
arbitrary method to measure equivalence scales; in the literature there are di¤erent methods
for measuring equivalence scale, none of them commands universal assent (see Deaton and
Zaidi 2002). The number of adult equivalents (AE) is dened as follows:
19The implication of using per capita consumption for poverty analysis is that households with children
are judged poorer on a per capita basis than they would be if their welfare level was measured on an adult
equivalent basis. Besides, using the per capita measures overestimates the impact of number of children on
poverty.
20In keeping with other studies (e.g Lanjouw and Ravallion 1995; White and Masset 2003), in this study
we do not make a gender distinction.
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AE = (A+ K) (12)
where A is the number of adults in the household, and K is the of number of children,
parameter  is the cost of a child relative to that of an adult, and lies between 0 and 1. The
parameter  which also lies between 0 and 1, controls the extent of economies of scale; since
the elasticity of adult equivalents with respect to "e¤ective" size, A + K is , (1  ) is a
measure of economies of scale. When both  and  are unity (the most extreme case with no
discount for children or for size) the number of adult equivalents is simply household size, and
deation by household size is equivalent to deating to a per capita basis. If  is zero, then
economies of scale are so extreme that welfare is the same for di¤erent households with the
same total consumption expenditure regardless of household size. The choice of the values
of the parameters  and  is arbitrary, we use the following values  = 0:65 and  = 0:9.
For the cost of children parameter, our value is based on the one used for Zambia by the
World Bank (2005). Being neighbors, we would expect the Zambian gures to be similar to
Malawis. With respect to the economies of scale parameter, our choice is motivated by the
fact that in most developing countries food is major component of consumption. And food is
largely a private good and therefore there are no economies of scale with food. This implies
that a high value of  should be used. The annualized real consumption expenditure for each
household is divided by the adult equivalent (AE) to have consumption per adult equivalent.
With this adjustment a household is considered poor if its annualized real consumption per
adult equivalent is below the three poverty lines discussed before.
The previous regressions were re-estimated in order to check the robustness of our ndings
to accounting for household composition and economies of scale. We present results (Table
15) for both univariate probit which assumes exogenous fertility as well as the recursive
bivariate probit. We have replicated the previous per capita results for comparison. For
the univariate probit regression, the results indicate that the variables are jointly signicant.
The simple probit results indicate that when we account for economies of scale and household
composition, fertility signicantly increases the likelihood of being poor across the poverty
lines. This e¤ect is monotonic as before implying our results are robust to choice of poverty
line, and that the rst order dominance assumption is not violated. As was the case with
the per capita poverty regressions, we nd that for the adjusted regressions the impact of
fertility across the poverty lines increases as the poverty line increases i.e. moving from ultra
poor to poor. However, as expected adult equivalent scale adjustment reduces the impact of
fertility on poverty. The reductions are economically substantial. For the ultra poor poverty
line, the reduction is about 83.4%, for the World Bank U$S1 line the reduction is 77.6%,
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and nally for the poor poverty line the reduction is 37.8%. This implies that the higher
the consumption the lower the reduction in the impact of fertility after adult equivalent
adjustments.
For the bivariate probit regressions a similar pattern emerges21. After accounting for the
endogeneity of fertility as well as economies of scale and household composition, fertility
signicantly increases the likelihood of being poor across the poverty lines. Besides, the
impact is not as economically signicant as that for per capita models, as it ranges from
0.012 to 0.177, compared against a range of 0.139 to 0.304 for the unadjusted models. Our
results are robust to choice of poverty line and the impact of fertility across the poverty
lines increases as the poverty line increases i.e. moving from ultra poor to poor. Compared
with the results from the simple probit models which account for economies of scale and
household composition, we note that the impact of fertility on poverty is underestimated in
the simple probit models. However, compared with the per capita bivariate probit results,
the results show that the impact is reduced. For the ultra poor model the reduction is 91.4%,
for the World Bank U$S1 line the reduction is 77.8%, and nally for the poor poverty line
the reduction is 35%. These are economically signicant reductions. We also notice that
these reductions are not very di¤erent from those found for univariate probit models. These
ndings suggest that it is quite possible that the impact of fertility would be economically
insignicant with some values of the equivalent scale parameters22.
The conclusion from these results is that accounting for economies of scale and household
composition reduces the impact of fertility on poverty, and that these reductions are eco-
nomically large. However, the impact of fertility is still statistically signicant regardless of
whether or not fertility is exogenous or endogenous. This far we have looked at the impact
of fertility on poverty with poverty dened as a dummy. In the next section, we investigate
the robustness of our results to treating objective poverty as a continuous variable.
5.5 Impact of fertility on continuous objective poverty
With poverty treated as continuous, we estimated a Two Stage least Squares (2SLS) regres-
sion of the impact of fertility on poverty measured as the log of real annualized per capita
21For the bivariate probit regression with adult equivalent adjustment we also nd that fertility is endoge-
nous, with the following Wald statistics (p values) for the three poverty lines; Ultrapoor 8.1933 (0.0042),
World Bank 4.2567 (0.0391), Poor 4.392 (0.0361).
22Another way of accounting for economies of scale is to directly include household size and the square
of household size in the poverty equation, however this approach ignores the interactions that may exist
between economies of scale and other variables included in the model.
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and adult equivalent adjusted consumption expenditures23. For the 2SLS regression all right
hand variables for the two regressions remain the same as in the bivariate probit24. In this
framework, we also estimated a naïve regression which assumes that fertility is exogenous.
This is done by using Ordinary least Squares (OLS). All right hand variables are the same
as those for the univariate probit regressions. The results are presented in Table 16. The
results indicate that for the OLS regression, fertility is negatively related to both per capita
and adult equivalent adjusted consumption. This implies that having more than two children
lowers consumption and hence increases poverty. This is similar to the nding earlier where
poverty is dened as a dummy. The impact of fertility on poverty is lower when we account
for economies of scale and household composition. Again this is similar to our earlier nd-
ings. The regression based Hausman test for endogeneity (see Woodridge 2002 for details)
shows that fertility is endogenous. This implies that our OLS results may be biased and
inconsistent.
The 2SLS results, which account for this endogeneity show that as is the case with the OLS
results, fertility is signicantly negatively related to both per capita and adult equivalent
adjusted consumption. However, the impact of fertility on consumption is higher when we
account for endogeneity of fertility. For example, the OLS results of the per capita regression
underestimate the e¤ect of fertility by about 2.3 times. The nding that accounting for
endogeneity raises the impact of fertility on poverty is similar to the one before where poverty
is dened as a dummy. Additionally, the impact of endogenous fertility is reduced when we
account for economies of scale and household composition. The reduction after accounting
for endogeneity of fertility (2SLS) is about 20%. We also note that this reduction though
economically large is smaller than the reductions found for poverty dened as a dummy.
To conclude, these results suggest that our earlier ndings are robust to a di¤erent concep-
tualization of objective poverty. Specically, with objective poverty dened as a continuous
variable; fertility increases the likelihood of being poor, that this e¤ect is underestimated
when the joint determination of the two is not accounted for, and that accounting for house-
hold composition and economies of scale diminishes the e¤ect. Our analysis so far has looked
at poverty in the objective and monetary sense which is a narrower denition of poverty.
In the next section, we present econometric results of the impact of fertility on subjective
poverty which is based on self reported well being.
23The F-statistic of the rst stage regression on the excluded instrument (girlIV) is 247.18 with a p-value
of 0.000. The partial R2 of the excluded instrument is 0.0376. Together these statistics suggests our IV is
not weak.
24The coe¢ cient for the instrument is .172 with a p-value of 0.000 suggesting that if the rst two children
are girls signicantly increases the number of children.
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5.6 Impact of fertility on subjective poverty
As before, we test for evidence of endogeneity between fertility and subjective poverty25. We
nd no evidence that fertility is endogenous with respect to subjective poverty. This is in
stark contrast to the objective poverty analysis where we nd that fertility is endogenous.
We therefore present results in Table 17 of a univariate probit regression since fertility is
exogenous.
Fertility is found to signicantly lower the likelihood that a household will be subjectively
poor. We nd that fertility lowers the probability of being poor by about 3%. This result
is however di¤erent from the objective poverty analysis where we nd consistently that
fertility increases the probability of being poor. This perhaps reects rural Malawis social
cultural context where those households with more children are treated with respect and
those with few or without children are looked at with some contempt. That is, having more
children elevates your status in society and these intangible benets feed into peoplessense
of wellbeing. Another possible explanation is that there is discounting taking place in the
sense that households with more children expect to have a higher future discounted income
and therefore feel less poor26. The results also suggest that the higher the dependency ratio,
the lower the subjective poverty, again we found an opposite e¤ect for monetary poverty. In
terms of the magnitudes, we note that the probability of feeling poor is lowered by 2.5%.
The fact that having more dependents makes households feel less poor can also be explained
by the cultural context that the more people depend on you the higher will be your social
status. And this intangible benet is reected in lower subjective poverty.
Interestingly, for all the other variables the results are similar in terms of the signs and
statistical signicance to those for monetary poverty. For example; education of the father,
number of enterprises, loans, growing tobacco, land, and ownership of livestock lower the
likelihood of being subjectively poor. We included a dummy variable marital status to cap-
ture some of the characteristics of the household head. We have three classes; monogamous
(mono), polygamous (poly) and the base category is those who are not married i.e. widowed,
divorced, or separated27. The results indicate that being married lowers the probability of
feeling poor. We further note that the decrease in the likelihood of feeling poor is higher
for polygamous households than it is for monogamous households. Specically, relative to
being widowed, divorced, or separated, being polygamous lowers the probability of being
25We estimated a recursive bivariate probit of subjective poverty and fertility, the Chi-square value (P-
value) of the Wald test for exogeneity of fertility is 0.17 (0.6766).
26We would like to thank Erik Thorbecke for pointing out this possible explanation.
27In our sample 64% are monogamous, 9.6% are polygamous, and 26.4% are either widowed or divorced
or separated.
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subjectively poor by 7.6% as against 5.9% for monogamous households. The same cultural
explanation can be given here where being married raises your status, and having more wives
further increases the respect that people may give you. The level of per capita annualized real
consumption is also included to capture household income status. We nd that household
economic status lowers the probability of feeling poor by about 10%.
5.7 Sample selection bias
As discussed earlier, our results are based on a restricted sample of women aged between
20 and 40, and the oldest child is under 17. This is motivated by the fact we need to have
households which still have at least the rst two children at home. However, this restriction
may lead to a selected sample i.e. a non-random sample. Sample selection may bias our
results. Sample selection may arise from; a) the possibility that older children may still be
at home, b) the fact that women in developing countries tend to marry at a very young age,
and c) the possibility that some women may start bearing children much later in life. To
check the extent to which the restriction a¤ects our results, we re-estimated the previous
regressions with the mothers age relaxed to between 17 and 50, and the oldest child to under
20. With this relaxation, the sample size increases to 4572 rural households.
The results are similar to those found before, thus giving us condence that our conclusions
are invariant to the age restrictions. For example (compare with Table 15), when objective
poverty is dened as a dummy and we control for household composition and economies of
scale, the marginal e¤ects (standard errors) of fertility for the recursive bivariate probit are
0.014 (0.003), 0.035 (0.006) and 0.148 (0.021) for ultra poor, World Bank U$S1 and poor
poverty lines respectively. The same picture emerges when objective poverty is dened as
a continuous variable (compare with Table 16), with 2SLS coe¢ cients (standard errors) of
fertility being -0.426(0.126) and -0.325 (0.116) for per capita and adult equivalent adjusted
consumption respectively28. Similarly, the relaxation does not change our conclusions re-
garding the impact of fertility on subjective poverty. The marginal e¤ect and standard error
of fertility on subjective poverty (compare with Table 17 ) are -0.022 and 0.002 respectively.
5.8 Two child versus one child families
In keeping with the literature (e.g. Angrist and Evans 1998; Gupta and Dubey 2006), our
analysis has been based on the restriction of our sample to families with at least two children.
28The results are also similar for exogenous fertility on objective poverty.
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We have argued that son preference which we use as our IV, would be more evident in the
birth of the third child and not the second child, since most families prefer having at least
two children. With this restriction, the corresponding son preference IV (two girls rst) only
works in causing exogenous variation in the transition from the second to the third child.
However, with this restriction, the higher-order birth IV may be correlated with poverty. It
may potentially be correlated with poverty in the sense that poorly nourished women may
have di¢ culty conceiving three times. This possible correlation may make the IV invalid,
and thus making our results inconsistent. To check if our results are a¤ected by this potential
problem, we re-estimated the previous regressions using a sample of families with at least
one child. For these new regressions, fertility (Zi) is re-dened as equal to one if a household
has more than one child and zero if it has one29. The corresponding IV (Mi), is re-dened
as a dummy equal to one if the rst child is a girl, and zero if the rst child is a boy30. With
this relaxation, the sample size increases to 6595 rural households.
The pattern of results is generally similar to those found before albeit with higher mar-
ginal e¤ects31. For example (compare with Table 15), when objective poverty is dened as
a dummy and we control for household composition and economies of scale, the marginal
e¤ects (standard errors) of fertility for the recursive bivariate probit are 0.032 (0.002), 0.044
(0.003) and 0.203 (0.001) for ultra poor, World Bank U$S1 and poor poverty lines respec-
tively. A similar conclusion is arrived at when objective poverty is dened as a continuous
variable (compare with Table 16), with 2SLS coe¢ cients (standard errors) of fertility being
-0.612(0.014) and -0.511 (0.033) for per capita and adult equivalent adjusted consumption
respectively. Interestingly, with the relaxation we nd that the marginal e¤ect of fertility on
subjective poverty is lower. The marginal e¤ect and standard error of fertility on subjective
poverty (compare with Table 17 ) are -0.014 and 0.004 respectively. This suggests that while
having a child makes a household feel less poor, higher-order births have an even bigger
e¤ect on subjective poverty. Since the general ndings are not di¤erent from those found
using a sample of families with at least two children, this reassures us that our conclusions
are robust to the denition of family size.
29See equation 4, for comparison.
30See equation 3, for comparison.
31The mothers age was restricted to between 15 and 40, and the oldest child to under 17. It should be
pointed out that alternative restrictions did not a¤ect our conclusions.
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6 Conclusions
In the paper, we sought to nd the impact of fertility on poverty while recognizing the
fact that the two variables are jointly determined. The study uses data from the Second
Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2). By using a natural experiment, son preference
as our instrumental variable, we are able to use exogenous variation in number of children to
uncover the causal e¤ect of fertility on poverty of rural households in Malawi. First, we have
looked at poverty dened in the monetary sense. A menu of three poverty lines has been
used to check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of a poverty line. Results from the
naïve probit models show that fertility increases the likelihood of being poor. Since fertility
is found to be endogenous, we estimated a recursive bivariate probit where son preference
is used as an IV. For the bivariate probit models, it has been found that fertility increases
the likelihood of being poor as well. However, this e¤ect is larger for endogenous fertility,
implying that when fertility is treated as exogenous its e¤ect on poverty is underestimated.
For both the base scenario of exogenous fertility and that of endogenous fertility, its impact
has been found to be robust to choice of poverty line. The positive impact of fertility on
objective poverty has also been shown to hold when household composition and economies are
accounted for, though the e¤ect tends to be reduced. It has also been demostrated that when
objective poverty is conceptualized as a continuos variable this does not change our nding
that fertility increases poverty and that its e¤ect is higher when fertility is endogenous.
Second, we have looked at poverty dened more broadly by using self rated assessments of
welfare. It has been shown that subjective poverty and objective poverty are related albeit
weakly. Interestingly, fertility has been found to be exogenous with respect to subjective
poverty, probably suggesting that the endogeneity of fertility is a monetary phenomenon.
In terms of its impact on subjective poverty, it has been found to have the opposite e¤ect
to that found under objective poverty. That is having more than two children lowers the
probability of feeling poor, probably reecting the fact that having more children elevates
your status in society and these intangible benets feed into peoplessense of wellbeing. This
contradiction in the impact of fertility on the narrower objective poverty and the broader
subjective poverty might be a possible explanation for why families in rural Malawi have
many children (in spite of this making them poor in the objective monetary sense) as it
makes them feel less poor.
Though the study is able to estimate a causal relationship between fertility and poverty, it is
worth pointing out that the study is static in nature and therefore cannot capture dynamic
aspects of the relationship between poverty and fertility.
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Table 1: Poverty lines and associated poverty rates
Poverty line name Poverty index Poverty line per year Poverty measure
Restricted All
Ultra poor Headcount 21.8% 24.4%
Poverty gap MK10029 5.1% 5.8%
Poverty severity 1.7% 2.0%
Poor Headcount 52.5% 56.4%
Poverty gap MK16165 17.7% 19.3%
Poverty severity 7.8% 8.7%
World Bank (US$1) Headcount 27.7% 30.6%
Poverty gap MK11051 6.9% 7.9%
Poverty severity 2.5% 2.9%
Notes:The ultra poor poverty line is a food poverty line. The poverty lines are expressed in Malawi Kwacha (MK).
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Table 2: Poverty headcount and fertility
Poverty line name Number of Children Poverty Headcount
Restricted All
Ultrapoor Less than three 15.9% 17.5%
Between three and six 33.1% 33.9%
Greater than six 45.3% 42.8%
Poor Less than three 46.2% 47.3%
Between three and six 69.1% 69.8%
Greater than six 74.5% 71.6%
World Bank (US$1) Less than three 21% 22.8%
Between three and six 40.8% 41.2%
Greater than six 52.3% 48.8%
Notes: The ultra poor poverty line is a food poverty line.
Table 3: Subjective poverty and number of children
Subjectively poor headcount
Number of children Restricted All
Less than three 83.5% 85.38%
Between three and six 84.6% 85.12%
Greater than six 76% 76.51%
34
Table 4: Objective poverty and subjective poverty
Subjective poverty
Absolute poverty line Non poor Poor Total
Ultrapoor Non-Poor 1,261 6,759      8,020
Poor 98 1,709 1,807
Total 1,359 8,468      9,827
Cramér's V =   0.1156  Chisquare= 157.9 Prob> Chisquare = 0.000
Poor Non-Poor 987 4,195 5,182
Poor 372 4,273 4,645
Total 1,359 8,468 9,827
Cramér's V =   0.1596   Chisquare= 260 Prob> Chisquare  = 0.000
World Bank Non-poor 1,224 6,283 7,507
Poor 135 2,185 2,320
Total 1,359 8,468 9,827
Cramér's V =   0.1290   Chisquare= 191.5 Prob> Chisquare  = 0.000
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Table 5: Sample statistics
Restricted All   households
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Demograhics
childno 2.910627 .0365515 2.423051 .0286636
twok .7608118 .0082506 .6108187 .0066297
agemoth 29.10582 .1096724 37.50181 .240289
depratio 1.361335 .0169433 1.187387 .0141034
girlIV .188402 .0071974 .1373361 .00457
agemobirth 19.40541 3.838322 19.85218 3.949439
Education
prifem .0983405 .0067846 .1014171 .0059358
primal .1592433 .0108257 .1680409 .0084645
JCEfem .0558154 .0046985 .0536465 .0037974
JCEmale .1136867 .0065776 .1101352 .0050674
MSCEmal .0438612 .0042456 .0372241 .0031862
fathnon .751661 .0023005 .807705 .0034122
mothnon .891231 .0017032 .927293 .0062371
fathpri .1127936 .0063001 .0954657 .0041973
motpri .0589645 .0041884 .0425612 .0027699
fasec .1355454 .0073334 .096829 .0050333
motsec .0498045 .0044107 .0300455 .0025036
Employment
wagefath .2328373 .010074 .1859403 .0076554
wagemot .0414332 .0042292 .0309512 .003083
chworkhom .504807 .010293 .5184155 .0073577
workout .0446999 .0041152 .0746205 .0039465
noenterp .4597906 .016602 .4164337 .0131016
Agriculture
loan 1050.168 98.66299 1635.488 582.397
tob .2657778 .0119243 .2382278 .0097572
landpc 0.58458 2.652096 0.64926 1.424733
lnlivestpc 6.184791 .02887696 6.380213 .0250001
Religion
muslim .125529 .0077292 .1220689 .0066006
catholic .257815 .0109174 .2680185 .0093857
protestant .6340125 .0120363 .6403704 .0100509
Community
clinic .2998732 .0222924 .2924817 .021051
trading .0224902 .0064503 .024335 .0067625
Region
north .1271692 .0045091 .1283621 .0034756
centre .4070733 .0083056 .4092272 .0059133
Sample size 3402 6595
Notes: Restricted rural households are those which; have a mother aged between 20 and 40, the oldest child under
17, and have at least two biological children. All households are rural households with at least one child.
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Table 6: Marginal effects of the impact of exogenous fertility on poverty
Variable Ultrapoor Worldbank Poor
Demographics
twok 0.109*** 0.134*** 0.225***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.027)
agemoth 0.004*** 0.004** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
depratio 0.040*** 0.057*** 0.109***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.016)
agemobirth -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Education
prifem -0.028 -0.042 -0.123***
(0.026) (0.033) (0.046)
primal -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.019) (0.023) (0.038)
JCEfem -0.017 -0.023 0.043
(0.034) (0.039) (0.060)
JCEmale 0.041 0.033 0.055
(0.026) (0.033) (0.051)
MSCEmal -0.047 -0.049 -0.117
(0.045) (0.051) (0.075)
fathpri -0.006 -0.008 -0.056
(0.025) (0.031) (0.047)
motpri -0.010 0.017 0.084
(0.035) (0.048) (0.065)
fasec -0.053** -0.088*** -0.189***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.053)
motsec -0.070*** -0.066* -0.184***
(0.025) (0.038) (0.062)
Employment
wagefath -0.038*** -0.038** -0.060**
(0.013) (0.016) (0.024)
wagemot -0.034 -0.039 -0.012
(0.025) (0.031) (0.047)
chworkhom 0.008 0.026 0.020
(0.014) (0.017) (0.025)
workout 0.020 0.046 0.071
(0.028) (0.036) (0.051)
noenterp -0.020* -0.033** -0.095***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.019)
Agriculture
loan -0.031** -0.041* -0.049**
(0.002) (0.021) (0.024)
tob -0.012 -0.036** -0.096***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.023)
landpc -0.021*** -0.028*** -0.034**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.017)
lnlivestpc -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.062***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Religion
muslim 0.031 0.023 0.035
(0.026) (0.030) (0.042)
catholic 0.029 0.032 0.018
(0.019) (0.024) (0.033)
protestant 0.036** 0.021 0.001
(0.017) (0.022) (0.032)
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Table 6: continued
Variable Ultrapoor Worldbank Poor
Community
clinic -0.033*** -0.048*** -0.071***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021)
trading -0.028 -0.042 -0.093
(0.032) (0.038) (0.062)
Region
north 0.016 0.010 0.045
(0.017) (0.020) (0.031)
centre -0.105*** -0.144*** -0.190***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.022)
Loglikelihood -1274.66 -1470.5 -1904.2
Chisquare 511.47 624.9 892.5
Prob > Chisquare 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 3402 3402 3402
McFadden R2 0.167 0.175 0.19
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is
a poverty indicator based on annualized per capita real consumption expenditure. The coefficients are marginal
effects evaluated as partial changes at the mean value of the continuous covariates. For dummy covariates, the
partial changes are measured as a discrete change in the poverty indicator as the dummy covariate changes from 0 to
1. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 7: Accelerated failure time Weibull model
Variable Mean Hazard ratio Transition 2 to 3 Hazard ratio Transition 3 to 4
boyz 1.94 1.12 0.114*** 1.11 0.113***
(0.018) (0.023)
wagefath .2328 2.71 0.100** 0.92 -0.073
(0.046) (0.062)
chworkhom .5048 0.90 -0.103** 0.74 -0.299***
(0.048) (0.081)
workout .0446 0.77 -0.259***      1.16 0.156*
(0.074) (0.081)
F-statistic 4.79 5.50
Prob > F-statistic 0.00 0.00
Sample size 2720 1651
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variables
are birth intervals moving from 2 to 3 children, and moving from 3 to 4 children. In addition to the new variable
boyz, the models also include all the other covariates included in the previous models. The hazard ratio is an
exponentiated coefficient. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 8: Son preference and the hand-me-down effect
Variable Sample mean ( m ) Mean difference ( mixmm - )
Two girls first
Education 1458.875 322.929
(264.87) (197.309)
[0.1017]
Clothing 4431.883 324.835
(7022.024) (199.979)
[0.1043]
Two boys first
Education 1199.512 63.566
(70.881) (100.73)
[0.5280]
Clothing 4173.29 66.249
(91.23) (118.75)
[0.5769]
Notes: Mean differences are defined as the sample means of rural households which have two girls first (two boys
first) ( m ) minus the sample of rural households which have a mix in the first two children i.e. boy and a girl (
mixm ).The means are weighted. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Numbers in square brackets are p-
values. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 9: Marginal effects of reduced form univariate probit regressions of fertility
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Demographics
agemoth 0.001* 0.001*             0.001*
(0.001)         (0.001)            (0.001)
depratio 0.148***        0.149***           0.148***
(0.023)         (0.023)            (0.023)
girlIV 0.102***        0.103***           0.102***
(0.020)         (0.020)            (0.020)
agemobirth -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.004)         (0.004) (0.004)
foster 0.003           0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education
prifem -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.019)         (0.019)            (0.018)
primal 0.027           0.025              0.025
(0.016)         (0.017)            (0.016)
JCEfem 0.020 0.023              0.019
(0.025)         (0.024)            (0.024)
JCEmale 0.074***        0.074***           0.073***
(0.020)         (0.020)            (0.020)
MSCEmal 0.084***        0.085***           0.083***
(0.028)         (0.028)            (0.028)
fathpri -0.029 -0.029 -0.024
(0.027)         (0.027)            (0.026)
motpri -0.005 -0.007 -0.007
(0.025)         (0.025)            (0.026)
fasec -0.152*** -0.151*** -0.146***
(0.052)         (0.052) (0.051)
motsec -0.044 -0.052 -0.046
(0.043)         (0.044)            (0.043)
Employment
wagefath 0.007           0.006              0.007
(0.008)         (0.008)            (0.008)
wagemot 0.017           0.018              0.017
(0.011)         (0.011)            (0.011)
chworkhom 0.103***        0.103***           0.104***
(0.026)         (0.025)            (0.026)
workout 0.026           0.028*             0.027*
(0.016)         (0.016)            (0.016)
noenterp -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.006)         (0.006)            (0.006)
Agriculture
loan 0.003           0.005 0.002
(0.006)         (0.004)            (0.002)
tob 0.011           0.016**            0.010
(0.007)         (0.008)            (0.007)
landpc -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.003)         (0.002)            (0.003)
lnlivestpc -0.005* -0.004 -0.005
(0.003)         (0.003)            (0.003)
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Table 9: continued
Variable (1)              (2) (3)
Religion
muslim 0.011              0.016
(0.011)            (0.011)
catholic 0.001 -0.001
(0.010)            (0.010)
protestant 0.016              0.015
(0.011)            (0.011)
Community
clinic 0.007           0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)            (0.007)
trading -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.022)         (0.022)            (0.021)
Region
north -0.004 -0.002
(0.012)                            (0.012)
centre 0.020**                            0.022**
(0.008)                            (0.009)
Loglikelihood -867.28 -870.62 -864.89
Chisquare 2006.61 2001.93 2013.39
Prob > Chisquare 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 3402 3402 3402
McFadden R2 0.536 0.535 0.538
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable
is a dummy for more than two children. The coefficients are marginal effects evaluated as partial changes at the
mean value of the continuous covariates. For dummy covariates, the partial changes are measured as a discrete
change in the poverty indicator as the dummy covariate changes from 0 to 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard
errors.
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Table 10: Cross equation error correlation
Name of poverty line Rho 95% Confidence Interval
Ultra poor -.2431234 -.3882092 -.0862774
Poor -.1865539 -.3436128 -.0193431
World Bank (US$1) -.177207 -.326869 -.0188744
Table 11: Wald test for exogeneity of fertility
Name of poverty line Chi square Prob. > Chi square
Ultra poor 9.05406 0.0026
Poor 4.76884 0.0290
World Bank (US$1) 4.79995 0.0285
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Table 12: Impact of endogenous fertility on poverty (ultra poor)
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Demographics
twok 0.139*** 0.139***
(0.014)                      (0.014)
girlIV 0.011**        0.011**        0.105***
(0.005) 0.005)        (0.020)
agemoth 0.003*** 0.001 0.004***       0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)        (0.001)
depratio 0.057*** -0.028*** 0.043***       0.151***
(0.008)         (0.006)       (0.007)        (0.023)
agemobirth -0.011***       0.003*** -0.009*** -0.020***
(0.002)         (0.001) (0.002)         (0.005)
Education
prifem -0.027 -0.002 -0.028 -0.002
(0.023)         (0.004)       (0.024)        (0.017)
primal -0.010 -0.007* -0.013          0.028*
(0.015)         (0.004)       (0.016)        (0.016)
JCEfem -0.014 -0.006 -0.017          0.020
(0.031)         (0.006)       (0.033)        (0.024)
JCEmale 0.047** -0.012**       0.042*         0.074***
(0.024)         (0.005)       (0.025)        (0.021)
MSCEmal -0.032 -0.022*** -0.043          0.085***
(0.042)         (0.008)       (0.044)        (0.029)
fathpri -0.009           0.005 -0.006 -0.030
(0.020)         (0.006)       (0.022)        (0.028)
motpri -0.007           0.001 -0.007 -0.007
(0.029)         (0.006)       (0.031)        (0.025)
fasec -0.063***        0.014 -0.057** -0.146***
(0.020)         (0.009)       (0.023)        (0.054)
motsec -0.065*** -0.001 -0.066*** -0.048
(0.022)         (0.006)       (0.024)        (0.043)
Employment
wagefath -0.035*** -0.005** -0.037***       0.007
(0.012)         (0.002)       (0.013)        (0.008)
wagemot -0.031 -0.006** -0.034          0.019*
(0.022)         (0.003)       (0.023)        (0.011)
chworkhom 0.018 -0.021***      0.007          0.108***
(0.014)         (0.006)       (0.014)        (0.025)
workout 0.027 -0.006         0.024          0.030*
(0.026)         (0.004)       (0.027)        (0.016)
noenterp -0.019* -0.002 -0.020* -0.001
(0.011) (0.001)       (0.011)        (0.006)
Agriculture
loan -0.021*** -0.032*** -0.053***       0.001
(0.001)         (0.002)       (0.002)        (0.001)
tob -0.010 -0.003 -0.012          0.010
(0.014)         (0.002)       (0.015)        (0.007)
landpc -0.011*** -0.003 -0.012** -0.001
(0.001)         (0.003)       (0.002)        (0.001)
lnlivestpc -0.030*** -0.002** -0.031*** -0.005
(0.004)         (0.001)       (0.005)        (0.003)
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Table 12: Continued
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Religion
muslim 0.031 -0.002         0.031          0.017
(0.028)         (0.003) (0.029)        (0.012)
catholic 0.025           0.002         0.027          0.000
(0.019)         (0.003)       (0.020)        (0.011)
protestant 0.035** -0.000         0.035**        0.016
(0.015)         (0.003)       (0.016)        (0.012)
Community
clinic -0.029** -0.004* -0.031**        0.006
(0.014)         (0.002)       (0.014)        (0.007)
trading -0.027 -0.002 -0.029 -0.000
(0.032)         (0.004)       (0.033)        (0.019)
Region
north 0.012           0.001         0.013 -0.001
(0.022)         (0.004)       (0.023)        (0.013)
centre -0.093*** -0.013*** -0.100***       0.023**
(0.015)         (0.004)       (0.015)        (0.009)
Chisquare 725.23
Prob > Chisquare 0.00
Sample size 3402
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The coefficients are
marginal effects. For variables which appear in both the poverty and fertility equations, the marginal effects are
decomposed into two effects. The direct effect produced by its presence in the poverty equation, and an indirect
effect which works through the fertility equation. The sum of the two makes the total effect. The total effect may not
exactly equal the sum of the two effects due to rounding. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The poverty
equation is based on annualized per capita real consumption expenditure.
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Table 13: Impact of endogenous fertility on poverty (World Bank)
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Demographics
twok 0.167*** 0.167***
(0.020)                       (0.020)
girlIV 0.010*        0.010* 0.106***
(0.005) (0.005)        (0.020)
agemoth 0.003** -0.002 0.003**        0.001
(0.001)         (0.002)       (0.001)        (0.001)
depratio 0.080*** -0.033***      0.059***       0.150***
(0.010)         (0.007)       (0.010)        (0.023)
agemobirth -0.013***       0.004*** -0.010*** -0.020***
(0.002)         (0.001)        (0.002) (0.005)
Education
prifem -0.040 -0.002 -0.042 -0.003
(0.034)         (0.005)       (0.035)        (0.017)
primal -0.008 -0.008* -0.013          0.027
(0.017)         (0.004)       (0.018)        (0.016)
JCEfem -0.018 -0.007 -0.023          0.020
(0.036)         (0.007)       (0.038)        (.024)
JCEmale 0.043 -0.016***      0.033          0.075***
(0.031)         (0.006)       (0.032) (0.021)
MSCEmal -0.030 -0.024*** -0.046          0.086***
(0.049)         (0.009)       (0.051)        (0.029)
fathpri -0.012           0.006 -0.008 -0.028
(0.025)         (0.007)       (0.027)        (0.028)
motpri 0.017           0.003         0.019 -0.007
(0.046)         (0.007)       (0.048)        (0.024)
fasec -0.099*** 0.015 -0.091*** -0.147***
(0.024)         (0.010)       (0.028)        (0.054)
motsec -0.064*          0.003 -0.062* -0.046
(0.035)         (0.009)       (0.038) (0.043)
Employment
wagefath -0.035** -0.004* -0.038**        0.007
(0.016)         (0.002)       (0.016)        (0.008)
wagemot -0.036 -0.006** -0.040          0.018
(0.027)         (0.003)       (0.028)        (0.011)
chworkhom 0.039** -0.024***      0.024          0.108***
(0.017)         (0.006)       (0.017)        (0.025)
workout 0.053 -0.006         0.050          0.029*
(0.034)         (0.005)       (0.035)        (0.016)
noenterp -0.031** -0.002 -0.033** -0.001
(0.013)         (0.002)       (0.013)        (0.006)
Agriculture
loan -0.026*** -0.022** -0.046**        0.002
(0.002)         (0.005)       (0.001)        (0.002)
tob -0.032* -0.005** -0.035*         0.010
(0.017)         (0.002)       (0.018)        (0.007)
landpc -0.002* -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
(0.001)         (0.002)       (0.003)        (0.002)
lnlivestpc -0.038*** -0.001* -0.039*** -0.005*
(0.005)         (0.001)       (0.006)        (0.003)
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Table 13: Continued
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Religion
muslim 0.025 -0.003         0.023          0.017
(0.033)         (0.004)       (0.034)        (0.012)
catholic 0.029           0.002 0.030 -0.000
(0.023)         (0.003)       (0.024)        (0.011)
protestant 0.022 -0.002         0.021          0.015
(0.021)         (0.003) (0.022)        (0.012)
Community
clinic -0.043** -0.005* -0.046**        0.007
(0.018)         (0.002)       (0.019)        (0.007)
trading -0.040 -0.003 -0.042 -0.001
(0.037)         (0.005)       (0.038)        (0.020
Region
north 0.007           0.001         0.008 -0.001
(0.027)         (0.004)       (0.029)        (0.013)
centre -0.130*** -0.015*** -0.141***       0.024**
(0.019)         (0.005)       (0.019)        (0.009)
Chisquare 828.37
Prob > Chisquare 0.00
Sample size 3402
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The coefficients are
marginal effects. For variables which appear in both the poverty and fertility equations, the marginal effects are
decomposed into two effects. The direct effect produced by its presence in the poverty equation, and an indirect
effect which works through the fertility equation. The sum of the two makes the total effect. The total effect may not
exactly equal the sum of the two effects due to rounding. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The poverty
equation is based on annualized per capita real consumption expenditure.
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Table 14: Impact of endogenous fertility on poverty (poor)
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Demographics
twok 0.304*** 0.304***
(0.040) (0.040)
girlIV 0.015** 0.015** 0.106***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.020)
agemoth 0.006*** -0.003 0.006***          0.001
(0.002)         (0.002)          (0.002)           (0.001)
depratio 0.169*** -0.081***         0.109***          0.148***
(0.020)         (0.016) (0.017)           (0.023)
agemobirth -0.024*** 0.010*** -0.016*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Education
prifem -0.119*** -0.005 -0.124*** -0.002
(0.042)         (0.010)          (0.044)           (0.017)
primal -0.001 -0.017 -0.014             0.028
(0.038)         (0.011) (0.041)           (0.017)
JCEfem 0.048 -0.011            0.041             0.022
(0.055)         (0.014)          (0.059)           (0.024)
JCEmale 0.084* -0.041***         0.054             0.075***
(0.047)         (0.014)          (0.050)           (0.021)
MSCEmal -0.074 -0.055*** -0.118             0.086***
(0.070)         (0.019)          (0.074) (0.029)
fathpri -0.064           0.013 -0.055 -0.029
(0.043)         (0.016)          (0.046)           (0.028)
motpri 0.079           0.009            0.088 -0.008
(0.061)         (0.016)          (0.064)           (0.025)
fasec -0.228***        0.049* -0.195*** -0.148***
(0.043)         (0.025)          (0.050)           (0.054)
motsec -0.185***        0.009 -0.181*** -0.047
(0.057)         (0.018)          (0.063)           (0.042)
Employment
wagefath -0.055** -0.007 -0.061**           0.007
(0.024)         (0.004)          (0.025)           (0.007)
wagemot -0.008 -0.010 -0.016             0.016
(0.046)         (0.007)          (0.047)           (0.011)
chworkhom         0.062** -0.060***         0.016             0.107***
(0.028)         (0.015)          (0.027)           (0.025)
workout           0.088* -0.015            0.077             0.029*
(0.049)         (0.011)          (0.050)           (0.016)
noenterp -0.091*** -0.004 -0.095*** -0.001
(0.020)         (0.004)          (0.020)           (0.006)
Agriculture
loan -0.028*** -0.001 -0.029*** 0.003
(0.002)         (0.004)          (0.005)           (0.007)
tob -0.087*** -0.010** -0.096***          0.011
(0.028)         (0.005)          (0.029)           (0.007)
landpc -0.002*          0.002 -0.004 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)          (0.004)           (0.002)
lnlivestpc -0.060*** -0.004 -0.061*** -0.005*
(0.007)         (0.002)          (0.007)           (0.003)
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Table 14: Continued
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Religion
muslim 0.039 -0.008            0.033             0.016
(0.044)         (0.007)          (0.044)           (0.012)
catholic 0.015           0.001            0.016 -0.001
(0.033)         (0.006)          (0.035)           (0.011)
protestant 0.006 -0.008 -0.001             0.014
(0.031) (0.007)          (0.033)           (0.012)
Community
clinic -0.064** -0.007 -0.070**           0.007
(0.027)         (0.004)          (0.028)           (0.007)
trading -0.089 -0.005 -0.094             0.001
(0.085)         (0.010)          (0.088)           (0.019)
Region
north 0.040           0.002            0.042 -0.000
(0.045)         (0.008) (0.046)           (0.013)
centre -0.171*** -0.022*** -0.190***          0.024**
(0.029)         (0.007)          (0.029)            (0.009)
Chisquare 1076.35
Prob > Chisquare 0.00
Sample size 3402
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The coefficients are
marginal effects. For variables which appear in both the poverty and fertility equations, the marginal effects are
decomposed into two effects. The direct effect produced by its presence in the poverty equation, and an indirect
effect which works through the fertility equation. The sum of the two makes the total effect. The total effect may not
exactly equal the sum of the two effects due to rounding. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The poverty
equation is based on annualized per capita real consumption expenditure.
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Table 15: Accounting for household composition and economies of scale (marginal effects)
Ultrapoor Worldbank Poor
Variable per capita AES per capita AES per capita AES
UNIVARIATE PROBIT
twok 0.109*** 0.018*** 0.134*** 0.030*** 0.225*** 0.147***
(0.013)  (0.004)          (0.016)    (0.005)       (0.027) (0.015)
All covariates   Yes      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chisquare 511.47 208.69 624.9 263.63 892.5 542.73
Prob > Chisquare 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 0.00
McFadden R2 0.167 0.18 0.175 0.176 0.19 0.153
BIVARIATE PROBIT
Twok 0.139*** 0.026*** 0.167***    0.037*** 0.304*** 0.177***
(0.014) (0.002) (0.020)     (0.006) (0.040) (0.020)
Instrument girlIV girlIV girlIV girlIV girlIV girlIV
All covariates    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chisquare 725.23 4792.6 828.37 665.49 1076.35 779.68
Prob > Chisquare 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors. The per capita poverty equations are based on annualized per capita real consumption
expenditure, and AES poverty equations are based on annualized real consumption expenditure per adult equivalent
scale and economies of scale.  For the poverty equations in the bivariate probit we report the total marginal effects
only. For brevity total marginal effects of the fertility equation for the bivariate probit are not reported. The per
capita results are replicated from earlier regressions for comparison.
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Table 16: OLS and 2SLS results of continuous fertility and poverty
OLS 2SLS
Variable per capita AES per capita AES
Twok -0.298*** -0.172*** -0.568*** -0.456***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.124) (0.122)
Instrument - - girlIV girlIV
All covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hausman test - - 0.281** 0.295**
(0.125) (0.123)
Mean of dep variable 9.627 9.99 9.627 9.99
(.578) (.547) (.578) (.547)
F-stat 59.75 43.45 53.86 40.18
Prob> F-stat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 3402 3402 3402 3402
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors. The dependent variables for the per capita models are log of the annualized per capita real
consumption expenditure. The dependent variables for the AES regressions are the log of the annualized real
consumption expenditure per adult equivalent and economies of scale. The Hausman test is a regression based test
of endogeneity of fertility.
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Table 17: Impact of fertility on subjective poverty
Variable
Demographics
twok -0.025**
(0.012)
depratio -0.016***
(0.005)
mono -0.059***
(0.011)
poly -0.076***
(0.022)
Education
prifem -0.046***
(0.014)
primal -0.008
(0.013)
JCEfem -0.055***
(0.019)
JCEmale -0.012
(0.014)
MSCEmal -0.034
(0.022)
fathpri -0.041*
(0.022)
motpri 0.038**
(0.018)
fasec -0.134***
(0.029)
motsec -0.012
(0.029)
Employment
wagefath -0.010
(0.012)
wagemot -0.040
(0.027)
chworkhom -0.048***
(0.011)
workout 0.042***
(0.015)
noenterp -0.008
(0.005)
Agriculture
loan -0.002*
(0.001)
tob -0.040***
(0.011)
landpc -0.032***
(0.003)
lnlivestpc -0.024***
(0.003)
Consumption
lnrexpapc -0.099***
(0.009)
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Table 17: Continued
Variable
Religion
muslim -0.087***
(0.023)
catholic -0.003
(0.012)
Protestant 0.001
(0.012)
Community
clinic -0.011
(0.010)
trading 0.045**
(0.018)
Region
north -0.101***
(0.017)
centre -0.039***
(0.011)
Chisquare 857.003
Prob > Chisquare 0.000
Sample size 3402
McFadden R2 0.159
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is
a subjective poverty indicator based on the Economic Ladder Question (ELQ. The coefficients are marginal effects
evaluated as partial changes at the mean value of the continuous covariates. For dummy covariates, the partial
changes are measured as a discrete change in the poverty indicator as the dummy covariate changes from 0 to 1.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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7 Appendix
Table A1: Definition of variables
Variable Definition
Demographics
childno Number of children
twok =1 if household has more than 2 children, 0 if it has 2 children
agemoth Current age of mother
depratioc Dependency ratio
girlIV =1 if household has 2 girls first,0 otherwise. Our instrument
agemobirth Age of the mother at first birth
Education
prifem Number of females with primary education in household
primal Number of males with primary education in household
JCEfem Number of females with junior secondary education in household
JCEmale Number of males with junior secondary education in household
MSCEmal Number of males with senior secondary education in household
fathnona =1 if fathers highest educational level is none, 0 otherwise
motnona =1 if mothers highest educational level is none,0 otherwise
fathpri =1 if fathers highest educational level is primary,0 otherwise
motpri =1 if mothers highest educational level is primary,0 otherwise
fasec =1 if fathers highest educational level is secondary,0 otherwise
motsec =1 if fathers highest educational level is secondary,0 otherwise
Employment
wagefath =1 if fathers works for a wage,0 otherwise
wagemot =1 if mothers works for a wage,0 otherwise
chworkhom =1 if children work at home,0 otherwise
workout =1 if children work outside the home,0 otherwise
noenterp Number of non-agricultural income generating enterprises
Agriculture
loan Amount of loan received in Malawi Kwacha
tob =1 if household grows tobacco,0 otherwise. An indicator of cash
crop production
landpc land per capita measured in square meters
lnlivestpcb log of the per capita value of livestock owned
Religion
muslim =1 if muslim,0 otherwise
catholic =1 if catholic,0 otherwise
protestant =1 if protestant,0 otherwise
othera =1 if other religions,0 otherwise
Community
clinic =1 if community has a clinic,0 otherwise
trading =1 if community is in a trading centre,0 otherwise
Region
north =1 if region is north,0 otherwise
centre =1 if region is centre,0 otherwise
southa =1 if region is south,0 otherwise
Notes: a denotes reference category. b The value of livestock is a total values of the following animals; cattle, goats,
sheep, pigs, chicken and other poultry. c The dependency ratio is measured as the sum of the number of people in a
household aged below 15 and above 65 divided by the number of people in a household aged between 15 and 65.
The number of females with MSCE (senior secondary) in our sample is zero we therefore don’t use it.
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